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INDIA IN 1983 
New Challenges, Lost Opportunities 
Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. 
India in 1983 faced enormous pressure in the turmoil 
and violence in Assam and the Punjab, deepening ethnic and communal 
enmities. Politically, with serious electoral losses in Andhra and Kar- 
nataka, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi went on the defensive, and the 
Congress (I) demonstrated the resilience that belies the pronouncement 
of the party's collapse. The opposition parties, still in internecine strug- 
gle, continued their unity efforts with the formation of two competing 
alliances. The economy, with good monsoons to invigorate it, carried the 
prospect of record food-grain production and expanded, if still sluggish, 
industrial output. Internationally, Indira Gandhi was in high profile as 
chair of the Non-Aligned Movement and host to the Commonwealth 
Conference. Within the region, however, new tensions emerged in the 
relations between India and Sri Lanka, and prospects for Indo-Pakistani 
detente dimmed in an exchange of mutual accusations. 
Social Unrest 
Arising out of India's diversity, the "fissiparous tendencies" of re- 
gionalism, ethnicity, and communalism have long been sources of social 
unrest. In 1983 they converged in eruptions of violence that left 4,000 
dead in Assam and a caldron of discontent in the Punjab. 
The problem in Assam is rooted in the old conflict between Assamese 
and Bengalis, but over the past decade, the Assamese have seen their 
culture and political power threatened by the increasing number of 
Bengali immigrants. Competition for jobs has fueled ethnic resentment, 
and economic concerns have been compounded by Assamese grievances 
that the Center has neglected the state and exploited its resources. The 
volatility of the situation is further complicated by tribal resistance to 
encroachment upon their lands by Bengalis and Assamese alike. In 1979 
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the discovery that large numbers of illegal aliens from Bangladesh were 
on the voter rolls in Assam provided the impetus for student-led agi- 
tations to expel the "foreigners"-a movement that soon won the sup- 
port of virtually the whole of the Assamese-speaking population. While 
the conflict remained essentially ethnic, tensions took on an increasingly 
communal character as both Hindu and Muslim organizations exploited 
mutual anxieties. 
The catalyst to crisis was the government's decision to hold constitu- 
tionally mandated elections in February 1983 for the Assam state assem- 
bly and the 12 vacant parliamentary seats. The alternative was a constitu- 
tional amendment to postpone elections until such time that the disputed 
voter rolls could be revised and polling conducted peaceably. The As- 
samese students, joined by the non-Communist opposition parties, called 
for a boycott of the elections. As tension mounted the government sent 
in a contingent of polling officers from other states, together with police 
and paramilitary reinforcements. But as the police sought to maintain 
order in the cities, rural Assam erupted in violence-the most serious in 
India since partition in 1947. Assamese, Bengalis, and tribals attacked 
each other, and at the village of Nellie, the scene of the worst violence, 
Lalung tribals massacred at least a thousand Bengali Muslims-mainly 
women and children. 
Polling had to be postponed in 16 of the 126 constituencies; in 
another, a candidate was murdered and the election results coun- 
termanded. Elections could not be conducted for 7 of the 12 parliamentary 
seats. With the boycott by the Assamese, the state-wide voter turnout 
was less than 33%-half that of the elections of 1978. In one predomi- 
nantly Assamese district, the turnout was less than 4%. The Congress (I) 
won 91 seats, an overwhelming majority in the 126-seat assembly, but it 
was an empty victory. Viewed as illegitimate by the Assamese, the 
government was discredited even before taking office. 
In the months since the February elections, Assam has been relatively 
quiet-rather like an undetonated bomb that could go off at any moment. 
The issues remain unresolved, and the government's commitment to 
construct a half-billion dollar fence along the Bangladesh border has 
been greeted with derision in Assam and protest by Dhaka. 
As Assam receded from the headlines, events in the Punjab took a 
darker turn. Following its fall from power in 1980, the Akali Dal-the 
Sikh political party-submitted a memorandum of demands and griev- 
ances to the Prime Minister; tensions in the Punjab have grown as 
murders, bombings, and intermittent agitation have increased. The Akali 
demands center on the questions of Chandigarh as capital of the Punjab 
and the sharing of river water for irrigation among the Punjab and 
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adjoining states. Various religious demands, such as recognition of Am- 
ritsar as a "holy city," relate to Akali concerns for Sikh identity. The 
demands of the 1973 Anandpur Resolution for greater autonomy for the 
Punjab are more a talking point in Center-state relations than a serious 
aspiration for the moderate Sikh leaders who still retain control of the 
movement, but they are increasingly pressed by extremists led by Sant 
Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a zealot who has stirred Sikh revivalism and 
fueled Hindu anxieties. There is little support among Sikhs for an 
independent "Khalistan" (Sikh state) at this time, but the appeal of 
separatism could grow as extremists among both Hindus and Sikhs 
divide the communities in distrust and fear. 
In early 1983 various mediators tried their hand at bringing a settle- 
ment to the crisis that was pulling India's most prosperous state to the 
brink of chaos. The Center took the initiative in drawing the Akalis into 
renewed discussions, and Prime Minister Gandhi accepted the major 
religious demands of the Akalis. The Center indicated its willingness to 
place the territorial and water issues before special tribunals for adjudica- 
tion, but not until the agitation itself was called off. In March the 
government announced the appointment of retired Supreme Court Jus- 
tice R. S. Sarkaria (a Sikh) to head a commission to review Center-state 
relations more broadly. The Akalis, committed to greater state powers, 
welcomed the decision, but continued to press their demands through 
agitation. In April the Akalis' rasta roko campaign, blocking the roads in 
protest demonstrations, left 2 1 dead. 
In the following months, Hindu-Sikh antipathies deepened as Hindu 
chauvinists-the R.S.S., numerous Hindu "defense" organizations, and 
even some "secular" political parties-responded to the increasing stri- 
dency of the Sikh extremists led by Bhindranwale. In the first week of 
October, armed Sikh militants stopped a bus and shot its six Hindu male 
passengers. The same day, another band of Sikh terrorists killed two 
officials on a train. None too soon, the central government, invoking 
emergency powers under the Constitution, dismissed Punjab's Congress 
(I) ministry and imposed President's Rule. Police and paramilitary forces, 
with sweeping powers, sought to restore order as the new governor and 
his advisers settled in for what is likely to be a long and difficult period of 
reconciliation. An early settlement of the outstanding issues-and per- 
haps even shared power in a Congress-Akali coalition government-is 
imperative if Sikh moderates are to isolate the extremists. But the 
political costs for the Congress in neighboring Haryana and Rajasthan 
suggest that a resolution of the crisis may lie on the other side of the next 
parliamentary elections that will probably be held in 1984. 
Religious revivalism in the Punjab is mirrored in heightened com- 
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munal consciousness throughout India. Hindu-Muslim tensions, the leg- 
acy of history, are nurtured by jealousy, suspicion, and competition for 
scarce resources. In 1983 incidents of communal violence took a heavy 
toll, the most serious in Hyderabad in September. In recent years, as 
communal groups-notably the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Majlis-e- 
Ittehadul Muslimeem among the Muslims, and the Arya Samaj and 
R.S.S. among Hindus-have stirred the spirit of revival, religious festi- 
vals in Hyderabad have grown in size and devotional fervor. In 1983 the 
Muslim pankah and Hindu Ganesh processions-the largest ever and 
only one week apart-were shows of strength by each community and a 
provocation to violence that left 43 dead in 18 days of rioting. 
The volatility of religious sentiment-and its potential impact on 
electoral politics-was witnessed in November in the uproar over re- 
ports that vanaspati, the vegetable oil that is the staple of Indian cooking, 
was being adulterated by cheap imported beef tallow. Hindu revivalists, 
leading mass demonstrations, denounced the pollution, invoking the 
memory of the allegations of greased cartridges that spurred the mutiny 
of 1857. The opposition parties attacked Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
for her failure to safeguard the purity of the nation; Congress leaders, in 
turn, accused the former Janata government of having approved the beef 
tallow imports in the first place. In an atmosphere of growing militancy 
and confrontation, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (an R.S.S.-connected 
revivalist organization) launched a series of marches-ekatmata yagya 
yatras, or soul union pilgrimages-across the length and breadth of India. 
Prime Minister Gandhi warned of the "rabid communal forces" behind 
the marches and of the threat they posed in dividing the nation along 
religious lines. If she had been contemplating a call for early parliamen- 
tary elections, as many believed, it now seemed an unlikely prospect. 
Party Politics and Elections 
The year opened in the midst of the election campaigns for the Andhra 
and Karnataka assemblies. The two states had been under solid Congress 
rule since independence, surviving even the Janata wave in 1978. Politi- 
cians and the press viewed the elections as a referendum on the Congress 
(I)-not just on the discredited state governments, but on Prime Minis- 
ter Gandhi's leadership. In what looked like a rehearsal for national 
parliamentary elections (which must be held no later than January 1985), 
Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv, who played a key role in candidate 
selection, actively campaigned throughout Andhra and Karnataka, as did 
virtually all the major national opposition party leaders. 
In Andhra, Telegu film star T. N. Rama Rao, adored by his public as an 
avatar of the gods he portrayed on the screen, commanded center stage. 
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Rama Rao (popularly known as TNR) offered school-lunch populism and 
a call for the devolution of power to the states. Appealing to regional 
sentiment, he attacked the succession of centrally imposed Congress 
chief ministers-four in two years-as an affront to Telegu pride. The 
opposition in Andhra remained divided: TNR's Telegu Desam; a united 
front of Janata, Lok Dal, the two communist parties (the CPI and CPM), 
and the Republican Party; and, going it alone, the BharatiyaJanata Party 
(BJP). But the Andhra Congress itself was in disarray and party organiza- 
tion at the grass roots nonexistent. In the January elections, the Congress 
defeat was massive. With only 30% of the vote (down from 39% in 
1978), it won 60 seats in the 294-seat assembly. Other opposition parties 
fell before TNR's juggernaut: the Telegu Desam, with 46% of the vote, 
won 202 (69%) of the assembly seats. 
The issue in Karnataka was the conduct and style of the state Congress 
government under Chief Minister Gundu Rao. Here the opposition 
parties united in a Janata-led front. The Janata (with the regional Kranti 
Ranga party) took 95 seats in the 224-seat assembly. The Congress, with 
36% of the vote (down from 42% in 1978), won 81 seats. With inde- 
pendent and BJP support, the Janata had the necessary majority to form 
a government, with Ramakrishna Hedge as chief minister. 
The Congress also lost in Tripura to the Communist Party-Marxist, a 
defeat for which it was prepared, but the Andhra and Karnataka losses 
came as a shock. The Congress defeats reduced the party to power in 
only 14 of India's 22 states. And while analysts were too soon to read a 
national pattern into the results, loss of support among Harijans and 
Muslims in both states portended serious erosion of the Congress party's 
traditional electoral base. The results, moreover, underscored the in- 
stitutional weakness of the Congress organization and the costs of Indira 
Gandhi's imperious style. Throughout India dissidents within the party 
challenged Congress chief ministers with accusations of corruption and 
incompetence, and in Gujarat the Saurashtra-based faction broke away to 
form a separate Rashtriya Congress party. 
In late January, in the wake of the Andhra-Karnataka debacle, Gandhi 
named Kamalapati Tripathi, 77-year-old former chief minister of Uttar 
Pradesh, as "working president" of Congress to "look after the affairs of 
the party." The position came to naught, and Tripathi was soon bypassed 
by the new party troubleshooter, Rajiv Gandhi, appointed in February as 
General Secretary of the All-India Congress Committee. Efforts to re- 
vitalize the party began, but the long-promised organizational elections 
(last conducted in 1972) were never held. In February Prime Minister 
Gandhi dumped Maharashtra Chief Minister Babaseheb Bhosale, univer- 
sally described as a sycophant, and allowed the state Congress legisla- 
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tive party to choose as chief minister Vasantrao Dada Patil, a man with 
power in his own right. But Gandhi remained determined to hold the 
reins by balancing the state ministry with Patil's opponents. Himachal 
Pradesh's chief minister was the next to go, and then in August, probably 
at the urging of Rajiv, Bihar's controversial Jagannath Misra was forced 
to resign as chief minister. 
Congress resilience was evident in the February Delhi polls, where 
Congress won a solid majority, retaining Sikh and Harijan support, 
though losing the Muslims to the opposition. Having expected to lead his 
party to victory in Delhi, BJP president Atal Bihar Vajpayee submitted 
his resignation. The party leadership refused to accept the resignation, 
since it refused to accept the Delhi elections result as a bellwether for 
Congress resurgence. The Assam elections later that month brought 
Congress victory, but in the context of boycott and violence, the gov- 
ernment gained nether legitimacy nor respect. The next assembly elec- 
tions were in June in Jammu and Kashmir. The Congress, as expected, 
lost to the incumbent National Conference. In the Hindu-majority 
Jammu constituencies, however, Congress emerged as the favored party 
over the BJP-in part because the R.S.S., as it had in Delhi elections, 
withheld active support for its traditional BJP cohort and may have, as 
some believed, tacitly backed the Congress. In its campaign appeal to 
Hindu sentiment, in which Indira Gandhi joined, the Congress 
deepened Hindu-Muslim enmity in the volatile state and drove the state 
chief minister Farooq Abdullah-once a potential ally-firmly into the 
opposition camp. Also in June, the Congress scored major victories over 
the BJP in municipal elections in Madhya Pradesh, and in the Uttar 
Pradesh panchayat (village) elections, the Congress overwhelmed both 
the Lok Dal and the BJP. In the West Bengal panchayat elections, the 
Congress made important inroads into the rural base of the ruling Com- 
munist Party-Marxist. 
Any attempt to discern a pattern in these elections is like reading the 
entrails of a sheep. Local issues predominate, and even in the simulta- 
neous defeat of Congress in Andhra and Karnataka, the party lost each 
state for different reasons. And the party's victory in Delhi a month later 
was again highly idiosyncratic. Even in organizational disarray, Congress 
shows resilience, and it remains the only genuinely national party. Con- 
gress defeats, however, bolstered the fragmented opposition parties in 
their attempt to come together. In May Andhra Chief Minister T. N. 
Rama Rao gathered 24 leaders of 14 opposition parties at Vijayawada to 
discuss their common interests, including Maneka Gandhi, the Prime 
Minister's disaffected daughter-in-law. Earlier, in March, Maneka-more 
a nuisance than a political threat-had launched the Rashtriya Sanjay 
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Manch, a political party built on the memory of her late husband, Sanjay 
Gandhi. The opposition conclave spanned the ideological spectrum, and 
the Communists and the BJP used the occasion to take jabs at each other. 
Setting aside their differences, however, the parties adopted a statement 
sharply critical of Indira Gandhi and, in an expression favorable to 
regional sentiment, called for greater autonomy for the states-a likely 
theme for opposition unity. 
Pursuant to their agreement, opposition leaders again met in June in 
Delhi and in October in Srinagar in Kashmir. A fourth conclave, hosted 
by the CPM's Jyoti Basu, met at the end of the year in Calcutta. But the 
difficulties of achieving opposition unity were underscored by the failure 
of the BJP to attend the Delhi meeting and by the absence of both the 
BJP and the Lok Dal from Srinagar. In August the Lok Dal (the peasant- 
based party led by Charan Singh) and the BJP-together a major force in 
North India-formed the National Democratic Alliance. A month later, 
four parties came together to form a United Front: the Congress (S), with 
strength in Maharashtra; the Democratic Socialist Party, with a Muslim 
following and a base in Uttar Pradesh; the Rashtriya Congress, the 
Gujarat splinter; and, at the helm, the Janata Party. Remaining outside, at 
least for the time being, the Telegu Desam, the National Conference, 
and the two Communist parties indicated their support for the Front. 
Front leaders were also attempting to break the National Democratic 
Alliance-to wean away the Lok Dal and to isolate the BJP. But the 
United Front itself faces internal dissension, reminiscent of the factional 
feuds that brought down the Janata government in 1979 and hardly likely 
to enhance the credibility of opposition unity efforts. 
Janata president Chandra Sekhar gained national attention earlier in 
the year by his six-month, 4,000 kilometer padayatra (walk) from Cape 
Camorin to New Delhi to dramatize the party's concern for the rural 
poor and to call for a restoration of moral values to national life. But 
while projecting himself as the next Prime Minister of India, he com- 
mands little control over his own party. The Janata is factionally divided, 
and more conservative leaders, such as former Prime Minister Morarji 
Desai and Subramaniam Swamy, oppose the socialist thrust of the party 
and look with particular distaste on the influence of H. N. Bahuguna, the 
ambitious DSP leader, within the United Front. 
The opposition has yet to provide a national alternative to Congress. It 
remains divided, with two fronts, two Communist parties, and an array of 
regional and personal parties. The attempt to build a "left and demo- 
cratic" front, excluding the BJP, is not likely to provide that alternative. 
Despite its electoral losses in 1983, the BJP remains the strongest 
non-Communist opposition party, and an opposition alliance that does 
not include the BJP will be unlikely to displace Indira Gandhi. 
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The Economy 
After a year of low growth, principally the result of drought and world 
recession, projections for 1983-84 anticipate an increase of 5.5% in real 
national income, sustaining a high level of confidence in the performance 
of the Indian economy. Even the growth rate of 1.8% in 1982-83, 
however, can be taken as an achievement. Despite serious drought, 
agricultural production declined by only 4-6%-a testament to the 
modern inputs and expanded irrigation that have made India less vulner- 
able to monsoon failure. Industrial production, affected by power short- 
ages, the Bombay textile strike, and world recession, was down in 
1982-83 by 3.8%. On the power front, drought took its toll on hydro- 
electric output-and Madras faced not only power cuts that reduced 
industrial production but water scarcity so severe that there was talk of a 
partial evacuation of the city. Overall, even with deficient hydroelectric 
output, power generation grew by 7%; coal production expanded by 
4%, and petroleum production was up an impressive 32%-easing the 
burden of India's staggering oil import bill. Power, however, remains a 
serious bottleneck, as demand outstrips capacity. 
Projections for 1983-84 are favorable by almost every indicator ex- 
cept inflation, which in 1983 was again on the rise at an annual rate of 
about 11%. But good monsoons and expected bumper crops of rice, 
wheat, and pulses-an estimated food grains record of 141 million 
tons-should stabilize prices. Industrial output remains sluggish, but 
production is likely to improve following the good monsoon, filling 
hydroelectric reservoirs and expanding farmer's purchasing power. The 
end of the Bombay textile strike and an upswing in the international 
economy should also contribute to higher industrial growth. Public sec- 
tor performance remains generally poor and commands little confidence, 
but the private sector-buoyed by the liberalized economic policy- 
shows considerable dynamism. 
Pressure on foreign exchange eased somewhat as the trade deficit 
declined, the result of both increased exports and a significant decline in 
imports. India continues to face loan requirements to sustain economic 
growth, and now with limited access to concessional loans, India has been 
forced to borrow at higher rates of interest. The Government of India, 
however, even as it faces higher debt service, expressed the determina- 
tion to avoid the "debt trap" that has brought so many other developing 
nations to the brink of bankruptcy. 
Foreign Relations 
India's international relations in 1983 were bracketed by two major 
meetings in New Delhi-the 101-nation summit of the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) in March and the Commonwealth Conference in 
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November. In taking the chair of the NAM for a three-year tenure, India 
sought to set a moderate and pragmatic tone. This was reflected in the 
sober economic resolution calling for North-South cooperation, but the 
pointedly anti-American political resolution was hardly calculated to 
warm the industrial nations to the NAM's economic appeal. 
India, however, remained on course in its own efforts to balance 
relations with the superpowers and, as demonstrated by continued arms 
purchases from the West, to reduce its dependence upon the Soviet 
Union. In July U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz visited India, 
albeit briefly, to keep the Washington-New Delhi dialogue going. In an 
atmosphere of rapport tempered by frankness, India reiterated its con- 
cerns about the U.S. supply of arms to Pakistan and American resistance 
to India's efforts to secure confessional loans from the multilateral 
development banks. The U.S. policy is to reserve confessional loans for 
the poorest developing nations and to graduate more advanced nations 
like India to the hard loan windows of the World Bank and to the 
commercial banks. The commercial banks are pushing the policy, since 
they are eager to make loans to India-a nation with a low debt service 
ratio and a record of no defaults. New Delhi's response is that the U.S. is 
punishing India for its fiscal responsibility, while rewarding the profligate 
with confessional loans. If discussions underscored the differences be- 
tween the two nations, Shultz eased at least one concern with the 
announcement that the U.S. would allow India to buy spare parts for the 
Tarapur nuclear reactor from a third party (Germany later agreed), with 
the U.S. as a source of last resort. Rumblings of opposition from the U.S. 
Congress, together with the unresolved question of India's right to 
reprocess spent fuel, however, left no doubt that Indo-American difficul- 
ties over Tarapur are far from over. 
Within the region, the foreign ministers of seven South Asian nations 
(India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and the Mal- 
dives) gave their formal assent to the promotion of "collective self- 
reliance" in nine fields, including agriculture, health, rural development, 
transport, and telecommunications, at a meeting in New Delhi in Au- 
gust. South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC), however, will keep its 
distance from political and strategic questions, and many essentially 
multilateral problems, such as water resource development, are unlikely 
to be moved from the bilateral level upon which India has insisted. 
As the foreign ministers gathered to talk of regional cooperation, Sri 
Lanka erupted in Sinhalese-Tamil violence. A press report from Sri 
Lanka said that President jayewardene feared armed Indian intervention 
to protect the Tamils and had appealed to the United States, Britain, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh for military assistance in the event of an inva- 
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sion. No such Indian intervention was seriously contemplated, and 
throughout what could easily have become an international crisis, India 
acted with restraint. Nothing, however, could have been more calculated 
to raise Indian alarm than the prospect of outside involvement in Sri 
Lanka. New Delhi's response involved the enunciation of a doctrine of 
regional security: India will not intervene in the internal conflicts of a 
South Asian nation and strongly opposes such intervention by any other 
country. India will not tolerate intervention in a South Asian nation if 
there is any anti-Indian implication, and if external assistance is required 
to deal with serious internal conflict, help should be sought from a 
number of countries within the region, including India. 
India's talk of "noninterference" was not altogether matched by its 
public criticism of military rule in Pakistan and, amidst unrest in Sind, by 
Indira Gandhi's statement of support for the Movement for the Restora- 
tion of Democracy. Pakistani anger was compounded by a conference on 
Sindi culture held in New Delhi that was addressed by Indira Gandhi. 
For its part, India protested the stridently anti-Indian press in Pakistan 
and the implication by President Zia that India was behind the agitations 
in Sind. The "foreign hand" accusation was also raised against Pakistan, as 
Rajiv and some Indian officials-to considerable skepticism of the Indian 
press-proffered the notion that Pakistan was providing training, arms, 
and sanctuary to Sikh extremists seeking an independent Khalistan. 
Although neither Zia nor Gandhi were prepared to shut the door to 
continued negotiations on the no-war pact and friendship treaty propos- 
als, mutual accusations had strained relations and seriously set back the 
movement toward detente. 
In September Indira Gandhi was again on high ground diplomatically 
in her role as chair of the NAM. In a speech before the United Nations 
General Assembly and in an informal gathering of 24 heads of state, most 
from the nonaligned nations, Gandhi called for expanded loans to devel- 
oping countries and, more fundamental, structural change of interna- 
tional economic institutions-themes she again pursued in hosting the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in New Delhi in No- 
vember. Queen Elizabeth, on a state visit to India, gave a royal touch to 
the Commonwealth Conference, and Indira Gandhi, undaunted by prob- 
lems at home, held court with style and vigor. 
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